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RULE 14(a) AND ANCILLARY JURISDICTION:
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM AGAINST NON-DIVERSE
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' is the provision
for impleading persons not already party to an action. The rule permits a defendant, as third-party plaintiff, to assert a claim against
any person not a party to the action who may be liable to him for
plaintiff's claim against him. ' In addition, the rule provides for defenses, counterclaims, and cross-claims between the impleaded thirdparty defendant and the third-party plaintiff,3 and permits the thirdparty defendant to claim directly against the plaintiff.' These ancillary claims, arising from the main claim asserted by the plaintiff,
generally are allowed when the federal courts have jurisdiction over
the main claim.5 This is so even when the main claim is based upon
I FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) [hereinafter cited as Rule 14(a)] provides in pertinent
part:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as
a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be
served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him ....

The

person served with the summons and third-party complaint, hereinafter called the third-party defendant, shall make his defenses to the
third-party plaintiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other
third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the thirdparty plaintiff has to the plaintiff's claim. The third-party defendant
may also assert any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may assert any claim
against the third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third-party plaintiff ...
2 Id.
Id. See cases cited in 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 14.17 (2d ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as 3 MOORE]; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§1454-57 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER].
See 3 MOORE, supra note 3, 14.16[2]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §1458.
3 MOORE, supra note 3,
14.26, 14.27[2], [3]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
3, §1444. See generally Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. PITT. L. REv. 759 (1972); Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand
the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1963); Note, Ancillary
Jurisdictionof the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REV. 383 (1963); Comment, Pendentand
Ancillary Jurisdiction:Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1263
(1975); Note, Federal Third-PartyPractice- Ancillary JurisdictionSupports Third-

1976]

RULE 14(a)

diversity jurisdiction and both the third-party defendant and plaintiff are citizens of the same state.' Consequently, the courts often
adjudicate ancillary claims having no independent jurisdictional
7
basis .
The plaintiff may also assert a claim under Rule 14(a) against the
third-party defendant if that claim is substantially related to the
original claim against the defendant.8 An unresolved issue is whether
the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant requires a jurisdictional basis independent from the federal court's jurisdiction
over the plaintiff's main claim. Where original jurisdiction has been
based upon diversity of citizenship,' a majority of courts have demanded an independent jurisdictional basis for the plaintiff's claim
against the third-party defendant, especially when both plaintiff and
third-party defendant are citizens of the same state.'" However, a
growing number of courts have determined that ancillary jurisdiction
may support that claim." The federal district court of Kansas in
Party Defendant's Claim Against Plaintiff,8 UTAH L. REv. 145 (1963); Note, Rule 14
Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction,57 VA. L. REv. 265 (1971).
' See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1970).
1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE

§ 23 (1960); 1 J.

MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE T 10.90[3], .140[8] (2d ed. 1974); 2A J. MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE
8.07[5] (2d ed. 1975); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §3523,.at 56-58 (1975). Conversely, a court's refusal

to exercise ancillary jurisdiction requires that the alleged ancillary claim have an
independent federal jurisdictional basis.
See 3 MOORE, supra note 3, 14.16[1]; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §1459.
Diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts exists when the controversy is between
citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1970). Generally, courts have required "complete diversity" between opposing parties. See, e.g., Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 1 U.S. (3 Cranch) 575 (1806). Therefore, diversity jurisdiction would not exist if
any opposing parties are from the same state. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §3605 (1975). See generally Comment,
The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928); Moore &
Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction:Past, Present, and Future, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 1
(1964).
113 MOORE, supra note 3,
14.27[1], at 14-565. See Parker v. W. W. Moore &
Sons, 528 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1975); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d
890 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'g 53 F.R.D. 491 (W.D. Va. 1971); McPherson v. Hoffman, 275
F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Joseph v. Chrysler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347 (W.D. Pa. 1973) aff'd
mem., 513 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1975); Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp.
1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa.
1969); Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo v.
Western Md. Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967).
11See CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Fawvor v. Texaco,
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Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co.,'" in holding that such a claim did
not require an independent jurisdictional basis, identified several
factors for consideration in determining whether the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiffs Rule 14(a) claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant is proper.
The plaintiff in Morgan, a Kansas citizen, brought a diversity
action in the Kansas federal district court against Serro Travel
Trailer for injuries suffered in an explosion of a propane stove in a
trailer manufactured by Serro.13 Pursuant to Rule 14(a), the defendant impleaded Mitchell Co-op, a Kansas citizen and filler of the
stove's tank, as a third-party defendant." Plaintiff Morgan then
moved to amend her complaint under Rule 14(a)' 5 to assert a claim
directly against the third-party defendant.'" The court determined
that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff's main claim and that independent jurisdictional grounds were not necessary to support the
plaintiff's claim against Mitchell Co-op.' 7 By evaluating the
circumstances under which the additional claim arose, the court held
that it properly could assert ancillary jurisdiction over Morgan's
claim against the third-party defendant.'
In reaching this result, the Morgan court relied upon UMW v.
Gibbs,"' in which the Supreme Court outlined the appropriate circumstances for exercising pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."5 In
Inc., 387 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.
Mich. 1972); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Olson
v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D.Neb. 1965).
12 Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan. 1975).
'1 Id. at 697. Along with Serro, the two other defendants were: S/H Leggett & Co.,
manufacturer of the stove's propane tank, and Meynall Stove Co., manufacturer of the
stove. Id. All three defendants were citizens of Oklahoma; the Kansas plaintiff and
Oklahoma defendants establish the requisite diversity for federal court jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Morgan also sued Mitchell Co-op, a Kansas citizen and filler of the propane
tank. Mitchell Co-op moved for its dismissal as a party because its presence destroyed
diversity. The district court declared the destruction-of-diversity issue moot, however,
when it granted plaintiff's motion to drop Mitchell as a party-defendant. Id. at 699.
Id.

See text accompanying note 8 supra.
69 F.R.D. at 699.
'T Id. at 704-05. Since the plaintiff and third-party defendant were both Kansas
citizens, the requirement of complete diversity was not met. Therefore the court's
jurisdiction would be destroyed unless it properly could exercise ancillary jurisdiction.
6

18

Id.

" 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
2 Pendent jurisdiction, a form of ancillary jurisdiction, exists when a federal court

already having jurisdiction over a claim based upon federal statutory law determines
to resolve related state law claims in the same action. Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd.

1976]

RULE 14(a)

Gibbs, the plaintiff sought recovery in federal district court for damages under both federal labor law2' and Tennessee tort law.22 After
determining that the district court had jurisdiction over the federal
claim,2 the Supreme Court considered whether the lower court had
properly exercised pendent jurisdiction over the claim based upon
Tennessee law. 24 The Court initially determined that a district court's
power to exercise pendent jurisdiction exists when there is a state
claim so related to an Article III federal claim 25 that both comprise
"but one constitutional 'case.' "26 Three requirements of the existence
of this power are: first, the federal claim must be sufficient to give
the court subject matter jurisdiction;2 second, the state and federal
of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp. 865, 870 (M.D. Pa. 1975). See also Teamsters Local 20 v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 257 (1964); Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184,
1193-94 (5th Cir. 1975); Kerby v. Commodity Resources, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786, 789
(D. Colo. 1975).
Ancillary jurisdiction, a broader concept, is jurisdiction over" 'certain peripheral
aspects of a controversy that by themselves would not be cognizable in federal court.'"
Sipe v. Local 191, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp. 865, 870 (M.D. Pa. 1975),
quoting Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 79 (N.D. Cal.
1972). See generally Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1263 (1975).
2, The plaintiff alleged that mine workers' interference with his duties at a Tennessee mine violated §303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§ 187 (1970). 383 U.S. at 717-20.
2 The state claim alleged malicious interference with performance of a contract.
383 U.S. at 720. Both the federal and state claims were based upon an incident involving rival unions at a Tennessee mine. Respondent Gibbs had been appointed superintendent of the mine, which employed members of the non-UMW union. In conjunction
with that position, he was also given a coal haulage contract. The UMW members
picketed the mine, prevented its opening, and threatened Gibbs. Thereafter, Gibbs lost
his superintendent's job and the haulage contract. In addition, he allegedly lost other
haulage contracts in the vicinity. Gibbs sued the international union on both the
federal claim and the state claim. He based jurisdiction over the state claim upon the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Id. at 718-20.
Id. at 720.
2 Id. at 721. Stated another way, the issue was whether the district court properly
exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state claim, which otherwise had no independent federal jurisdictional basis.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part:
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority. ...
The federal claim in Gibbs arose under "the Laws of the United States." See note 21
supra.
26 383 U.S. at 725. For a discussion of Gibbs, see Note, UMW v. Gibbs and
Pendent Jurisdiction,81 HARv. L. REV. 657 (1968).
383 U.S. at 725. In Gibbs, the federal claim was based upon § 303 of the Labor
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claims must arise from "a common nucleus of operative fact";" and,
third, if the plaintiff's claims are such that, disregarding their federal
and state nature, the plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding," 9 the district.court has the power
to adjudicate those claims together."
Once the Court ascertained that the district court had the power
to hear the pendent state claim, it addressed the question of whether
that court had exercised its discretion in allowing pendent jurisdiction. The Gibbs Court held that such discretion depended upon "considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." 3' It pointed to several factors bearing upon those considerations: avoidance of "needless" decisions of state law, 32 pre-trial dismissal of the federal claim, 33 domination of the state claim,3 the
Management Relations Act of 1947, which conferred subject matter jurisdiction. See
note 21 supra.
11383 U.S. at 725. The "common nucleus of operative fact" was UMW interference with Gibbs' work, allegedly resulting in violations of both federal and Tennessee
law. That interference gave rise to both claims. Id. at 728.
29 Id. at 725.
30 Id. The Court held that the federal and state claims were "alternative remedies"
for wrongs arising from "a common nucleus of operative fact." Id. at 728. Implicit
within this holding was a determination that those claims for alternative remedies
would "ordinarily" be tried in one proceeding.
1' Id. at 726. The Court held that if the considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness were not present, then the federal court "should hesitate to
exercise jurisdiction over state claims" absent independent jurisdictional basis. Id.
32 Id. The "needless" decisions to which the Court referred are those in which the
state law is unsettled, the rationale being that resolution of state law is more appropriately left to state courts. Thus, a court may dismiss a pendent state claim brought
under a recently enacted state statute. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 991-92 (2d ed. 1973). This factor of avoiding decisions
involving unsettled state law is particularly important when considering plaintiff's
claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant in a diversity action. See text accompanying notes 81-83 infra. The Court in Gibbs held that the state law was sufficiently settled to permit its consideration by a federal court. 383 U.S. at 728-29.
Compare Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973), with Roberts v.
Way, 398 F. Supp. 856, 861 (D. Vt. 1975).
383 U.S. at 726. The rationale behind dismissing a pendent state claim after
the federal claim has been dismissed prior to trial is that there is no longer an independent jurisdictional basis over the federal claim to support pendent jurisdiction. The
Court, however, noted that pre-trial disposition of the federal claim was merely a factor
of discretion. In Gibbs, the Supreme Court upheld the exercise of pendent jurisdiction
even though the plaintiff ultimately recovered only on the state claim. Id. at 728. See
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403 (1970); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse
Co., 302 F.2d 843, 845-46 (3d Cir. 1962); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804, 807-08 (2d Cir.
1959).
" 383 U.S. at 726. The Supreme Court stated that the dominance of the state
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35
closeness of the relationship between the federal and state claim,
8
and the possibility of jury confusion. The Supreme Court's development of the "power-discretion".test in Gibbs has resulted not only in
an expansion of pendent jurisdiction (a form of ancillary jurisdiction)
but also in an expansion of ancillary jurisdiction.
Indeed, the Gibbs power-discretion test has been particularly influential in expanding ancillary jurisdiction in diversity actions." For
example, using Gibbs analysis, courts have permitted plaintiff's joinder of non-diverse defendants 38 and joinder of claims failing to meet
the required jurisdictional amount." Moreover, one circuit court has
implicitly used Gibbs to uphold the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
over a non-diverse third-party defendant's Rule 14(a) claim against
the original plaintiff. 0 Other courts, in cases like Morgan, have ap-

claim may be measured by the nature of the required proof, the scope of the claim's
issues, or the "comprehensiveness of the remedy sought. . . ... Id. The Court held that
although the state remedy was more comprehensive than the federal remedy, the
federal claim was nevertheless predominant and played a major role in the trial. Id.
at 728.
1 Id. at 727. The Gibbs Court held that because the doctrine of pre-emption was
implicated, the federal courts were "particularly appropriate bodies for the application
of pre-emption principles." Id. at 729. The judicially developed doctrine of preemption permits federal courts to hold that congressional enactments control when in
conflict with or burdened by state laws. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION-MAKING, CASES AND MATERIALS 255-57 (1975). Thus, the resolution of each
claim depended upon resolution of the other.
11 383 U.S. at 727. The Court considered that jury confusion might occur from the
treatment of "divergent legal theories of relief," resulting in different natures and
degrees of proof or the application of different legal standards. In Gibbs, the Court
determined that the district court avoided possible jury confusion by employing a
special verdict form, separating the federal and state claims. -Id. at 729. See Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973). But see Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68
F.R.D. 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
"' See, e.g., Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 569 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Roberts v. Way,
398 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1975).
2 See, e.g., Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.
1971); Jacobs v. United States, 367 F. Supp. 1275 (D. Ariz. 1973). Cf. Leather's Best,
Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971).
"' See. e.g., F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir.
1970); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp.,
392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
" Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715 (5th
Cir. 1970) ("same aggregate of operative facts serves as the basis of both claims").
Commentators have argued persuasively that the Fifth Circuit's test in Revere Copper
is the same as the Gibbs power-discretion test. Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of
FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. PITT. L. REv. 759, 784 (1972); Note,
Rule 14 Claims and Ancillary Jurisdiction,57 VA. L. REV. 265 (1971). Notwithstanding
the Revere court's express limitation of its holding to the facts, 426 F.2d at 716, other
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plied the Gibbs power-discretion test to find that no independent
jurisdictional basis is necessary for a plaintiff's claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant."
In a situation like Morgan, fulfilling the three Gibbs requirements
presents no insuperable difficulties. The requirement that the main
claim between the plaintiff and defendant be substantial" is inherent
in diversity jurisdiction, since it is that claim which invokes federal
diversity jurisdiction." In Morgan, the plaintiff's claim for damages
against all possible defendants invoked the federal court's jurisdiction. Likewise, diversity jurisdiction requires a very close relation
between the main and ancillary claims.4 The only issue in Morgan
commentators have suggested that the Fifth Circuit's rationale may be extended to
allow plaintiff's claims against third-party defendants without any independent jurisdictional basis. Comment, Federal Procedure - Rule 14(a) - Independent Grounds
for Federal JurisdictionHeld Unnecessary to Support Counterclaim by Third-Party
Defendant Against Original Plaintiff, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1303, 1312-15 (1970); Note, A
Third-PartyDefendant's Claim Against Plaintiff Upheld DespiteAbsence of Independent JurisdictionalGrounds, 1970 WASH. U. L. Q. 511, 514-15.
" Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 701, 704-05 (D.Kan. 1975).
See also Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975); CCF
Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Saalfrank
v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 387 F. Supp.
626 (E.D. Tex. 1975); Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
"2 See text accompanying note 27 supra.
13 Conversely, the court's power to hear the plaintiff's ancillary claim against the
non-diverse third-party defendant must be denied if the plaintiff's original claim appears to be a cover for asserting that third-party claim. In addition, the status of that
main claim throughout the proceeding is a factor to be considered in the court's
discretionary exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 84-86
infra.
1 See, e.g., Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709,
712-15 (5th Cir. 1970). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (g), 20(a), each of which requires
the "same transaction or occurrence." The Gibbs Court required that both claims arise
from a "common nucleus of operative fact." UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
See text accompanying note 28 supra. Similarly, Rule 14(a) requires that the plaintiff's
claim against the third-party defendant arise "out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff
[defendant] ...." FED R. Civ. P. 14(a). This "common nucleus" requirement must
be more strictly scrutinized because the federal court's diversity jurisdiction is less
compelling than its federal question jurisdiction. Comment, Pendent Jurisdictionand
Minimal Diversity, 59 IowA L. REV. 179, 188-89 (1973). The Ninth Circuit, however,
recently took a different approach:

[Dliversity cases have generally presented more attractive opportunities for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over additional parties
asserting state law claims than have analogous cases arising in the
context of federal actions based on federal question jurisdiction. In
part, this is due to the fact that since all the claims arising in the
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was causation of the explosion, thereby fulfilling the "common nuclepqs" requirement.15 Finally, extending Gibbs to diversity actions
requires that the plaintiff have -an expectation of trying his main and
ancillary claims in one judicial proceeding, disregarding the diverse
and non-diverse character of the parties. 6 If plaintiff Morgan had
brought her action in the state court, she could have expected a
disposition of all her claims. Although the three Gibbs requirements
are easily fulfilled, they provide only a prima facie demonstration of
the court's power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. Therefore, the
court must further examine the propriety of exercising ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant.
The Morgan court analyzed the arguments against asserting ancillary jurisdiction in its approach to the power aspect of the Gibbs
test.4" One argument is that the plaintiff in a diversity action should
not be permitted to assert a claim against a non-diverse party merely
diversity context are based on state law, they are for that reason more
easily tried together than cases where the two sets of claims are based
on substantially different theories of law.
Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1975) (dicta). See text accompanying
notes 67-71 infra.
11 69 F.R.D. at 704. Compare CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392
F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio
1975), with Mickelic v. United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
Jordan v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 317 F. Supp. 948 (D. Minn. 1970).
" See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. Because a federal court in a diversity
action applies state law, the plaintiff's expectation for settlement in one judicial proceeding would be automatic: if all the parties were citizens of the same state, that
state's courts could adjudicate all the claims in one proceeding.
" The district court also noted other factors dictating reconsideration of the complete diversity requirement. First, it held that the "anomalous" situation where both
the plaintiff and the third-party defendant were in the same courtroom but the plaintiff could not sue the third-party defendant required that it not "blindly" follow the
complete diversity position. 69 F.R.D. at 700. The court criticized that position for
relying on old and not unanimous precedent. This criticism is unwarranted because
there are recent cases requiring complete diversity. See Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred
Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'g 53 F.R.D. 491 (W.D. Va. 1971); Travis
Mills Corp. v. Square D. Co., 67 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Joseph v. Chrysler Corp.,
61 F.R.D. 347 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd mem., 513 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1975); Mickelic v.
United States Postal Serv., 367 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1973). The court then noted
that Rule 14 did not require diversity between plaintiff and the third-party defendant.
69 F.R.D. at 700. This argument is suspect, however, because none of the Federal Rules
confers jurisdiction. The district court also held that requiring complete diversity
,would defeat Rule 14's purpose of judicial economy. Id. Furthermore, because Rule 14
had been broadly used to permit other ancillary claims, the court held that a narrow
application to the facts in Morgan would be inconsistent with those other uses. Id.
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because he is a third-party defendant, when he could not assert a
claim directly against him as a defendant. 8 This indirect-direct argument49 ignores the fact that the defendant, not the plaintiff, must
implead the third-party. The Morgan court rejected the assertion
that the extension of ancillary jurisdiction to plaintiff's claim would
encourage a plaintiff to sue defendants in the hope of reaching the
third party whom he could not sue directly in federal court.50 In
addition, the argument results in the anomalous situation of having
the third-party defendant properly before the court but not reachable
by the plaintiff.-'
The indirect-direct argument also implies that the plaintiff would
be violating Rule 82 which prohibits the interpretation of the Federal
Rules to expand a district court's jurisdiction.2 If ancillary jurisdiction is permitted over the plaintiffs claim against a non-diverse
11See Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 703 (D. Kan. 1975);
Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893 (4t Cir. 1972).
11See Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972);
McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1960); Pearce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 162
F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1947); Travis Mills Corp. v. Square D. Co., 67 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Palumbo
v. Western Md. Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967); Welder v. Washington Temperance Ass'n, 16 F.R.D. 18 (D. Minn. 1954); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp.
305 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
" 69 F.R.D. at 703. Commentators likewise doubt that plaintiffs will sue defendants in the hope of reaching a potentially impleaded third-party. WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, §1444, at 231. However, a defendant would be foolish not to implead
someone who might be liable to him for all or part of plaintiff's claim against him.
Therefore, plaintiffs essentially can force the impleader of a third party, raising the
spectres of collusion and increased litigation. See text accompanying notes 56-65 infra.
1' See, e.g., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 700, 703 (D. Kan.
1975); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45, 52-53 (N.D. Ohio 1975). One reason that
the Saalfrank court exercised ancillary jurisdiction was that the plaintiff could find
no single courthouse in which to bring all claims arising out of an accident. Therefore,
the court stated, parties, witnesses, and tangible evidence would be shuffled between
state and federal courthouses, resulting in the plaintiff "incurring expenses solely
attributable to duplicated effort and at each end being forced to serve up only half a
loaf to the court." Id. at 52. The district court concluded that the best interests of
justice - based on Gibbs considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness
to litigants - would be served by exercising its discretion in favor of ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant. See also CCF Indus.
Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Davis v. United
States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972); Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F.
Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965).
52 FED. R. Civ. P. 82 provides in pertinent part:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction
of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
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third-party defendant, the plaintiff arguably is using Rule 14 to expand the district court's jurisdiction. 3 However, once the court has
jurisdiction over the main claim and all the parties, the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction over claims arising from the "same transaction
or occurrence" as the original claim would not be an extension of
federal court jurisdiction. 4 Rather, allowing the court to hear the
"entire case" is consonant with the purpose of Rule 14 to avoid multiple litigation and circuity of action. 5
The possibility of collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant is another reason frequently given for not exercising ancillary
jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against a non-diverse third-party
defendant. 6 This reason is based upon the assumption that a plaintiff
might seek a friendly defendant to implead a party liable to the
plaintiff but not reachable under federal jurisdiction. The argument,
" The Rule 82 argument is related to the indirect-direct argument: if the plaintiff
may reach the non-diverse person through a third-party claim but not through a direct
claim, he is using Rule 14 to assert a claim in federal court which he otherwise would
be unable to assert for lack of diversity. Arguably, such an action is an extension of
federal court jurisdiction by construction of the Rules, which is forbidden by Rule 82.
" Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 703 (D. Kan. 1975). Accord,
Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Malkin v.
Arundel Corp., 36 F. Stipp. 948, 950 (D. Md. 1941). Cf. Sheppard v. Atlantic States
Gas Co., 167 F.2d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 1948); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968,
973-74 (2d Cir. 1944). Commentators support the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over
plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant as a valid exercise of the
court's power once it properly has jurisdiction over the main claim between plaintiff
and defendant. See 3 MOORE, supra note 3, 14.27[1], at 14-572; Holtzoff, Entry of
Additional Partiesin a CivilAction; Intervention and Third-PartyPractice,31 F.R.D.
101, 110 (1963); Note, FederalThird-PartyPractice-Ancillary JurisdictionSupports
Third-PartyDefendant's Claim Against Plaintiff, 8 UTAH L. REv. 145, 148 (1963);
Comment, Five Years of Federal Third-PartyPractice,29 VA. L. REv. 981, 998 (1943).
See, e.g., Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697,700 (D. Kan. 1975);
Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Accord, CCF Indus.
Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Saalfrank v.
O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975). Contra, Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1972); cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970);
Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); See also Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdictionand
the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 42 (1963); Holtzoff, Entry
of Additional Parties in a Civil Action; Intervention and Third-Party Practice, 31
F.R.D. 101, 105, 110, 112 (1963); 3 MOORE, supra note 3, 1 14.27[1], at 14-570 through
571; Note, Civil Procedure- Ancillary Jurisdiction- The Third-PartyDefendant's
Claim Under Federal Rule 14(a), 49 N.C.L. REv. 503, 504, 507 (1971).
"' 69 F.R.D. at 702. See, e.g., Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d
890, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1972); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.,
30 F.R.D. 171, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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however, lost much vitality when Rule 14 was amended in 1946"7 to
require that the impleaded party be liable to the defendant for all or
part of plaintiff's claim." Thus, any third-party claim filed by the
defendant will be one from which he may recover. If that claim is
valid, the defendant's other motives for asserting the claim should be
irrelevant.59 In addition, the mere possibility of collusion between the
plaintiff and defendant should not operate as an absolute bar to the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Section 135960 permits the district
court to dismiss any action in which any party has been collusively
joined to invoke the court's jurisdiction. The preferable test, followed
by the Morgan court, is that the existence of collusion should be
determined on a case-by-case basis, with dismissal resulting when
Rule 14 is used solely to allow the plaintiff to reach the third-party
in federal court."
Another basis for prohibiting ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's
claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant is the fear of in" FED. R. CIv. P. 14, as amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 86(b).
11Prior to the amendment, a defendant could implead a third-party who was or
could have been liable to him or the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him. Subsequent to the amendment, he no longer may implead a person liable
directly to the plaintiff; the third-party must be liable to the defendant. Notes of
Advisory Committee on 1941 Amendment to Rules, FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
' WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §1444, at 231-32.
60 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) provides:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which
any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.
" 69 F.R.D. at 702. See Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45, 55 (N.D. Ohio
1975). The Saalfrank case is particularly interesting because there was evidence indicating collusion. The Indiana plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and
subsequently injured at the hospital where he was treated for the auto accident injuries. He corresponded with the Ohio defendant, the driver, successfully urging him to
implead the Indiana hospital. The plaintiff then sought to assert a claim directly
against the third-party defendant. The court permitted ancillary jurisdiction and held
that no collusion existed "where a party with a bona fide legal interest to assert solicits
another party with a similar bona fide legal interest to assert to bring suit and aids in
so doing." 390 F. Supp. at 54. It held that any such acts were "nothing more than sound
litigation strategy and enlightened assistance of counsel." Id. at 56. Accord, Olson v.
United States, 38 F.R.D. 489, 491 (D. Neb. 1965) ("the fact that there may be collusion
between the original parties in some cases should not prevent plaintiffs from asserting
claims against third-party defendants in all cases.") (emphasis in original). See also 3
14.21[1], at 14-571; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the
MOORE, supra note 3,
Joinder of Claim in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 42 (1963). Note, Rule 14 Claims
and Ancillary Jurisdiction,57 VA. L. REV. 265, 274-75, 279 n.96 (1971).
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creased federal litigation of state law claims.62 Whether this argument
refers to an increased number of original diversity claims or an increased amount of litigation within the already pending action is
unclear. The Rules provide for summary disposition of claims not
deemed worthy of trial."3 Therefore, any frivolous claims filed with
the hope of impleading a third-party defendant that the plaintiff
could not attack directly would be futile. Moreover, the fear that such
litigation will increase in scope should not operate as a bar to the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction. Rather, the increased scope of the
litigation should become a discretionary factor in deciding whether
the court should exercise such jurisdiction. 4 Arguably, the exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction over the plaintiffs claim against the thirdparty defendant would decrease overall litigation by allowing two
closely related lawsuits to be heard in one judicial proceeding. 5 Thus,
2 Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1975);
Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 704 (D. Kan. 1975); Saalfrank v.
O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45, 52-53 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D.
489, 492 (D. Neb. 1965); Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473, 474 (W.D.
Pa. 1969); Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 433 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
" See, FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), which permits a defendant to move for dismissal
if a valid claim has not been presented. Similarly, Rule 56(b), the summary judgment
provision, permits the defendant to challenge a seemingly valid claim without going
through an entire trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970) permits
the court to dismiss any third-party claims created collusively, the spectre of which
arises if the plaintiff asserts a claim against a defendant hoping he will implead a thirdparty defendant. Thus, it seems unreasonable to fear that plaintiffs will initiate more
diversity actions with the hope that they will ultimately be able to assert a claim
against a non-diverse third-party defendant impleaded by the defendant.
See text accompanying notes 72-80 infra.
Conversely, denying ancillary jurisdiction would result in the judicial inefficiency and inconvenience of forcing the parties to try essentially the same facts in the
state and federal courthouses. Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45, 52-53 (N.D.
Ohio 1975). See 3 MOORE, supra note 3,
14.27[1], at 14-572; Baker, Toward a
Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,33 U. PiTT. L. REv. 759,
780 (1972). Accord, Holtzoff, Entryof Additional Partiesin a CivilAction; Intervention
and Third-Party Practice,31 F.R.D. 101, 105, 112 (1963).
Whether plaintiffs could sue both the defendants and third-parties in state court
is a consideration that goes more toward the discretion of the district court than toward
its power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. In Morgan, the Kansas long-arm statute
probably would have permitted Kansas state courts to obtain jurisdiction over both
the diverse and non-diverse parties. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b)(7)(ii) (Cum. Supp.
1975). Nevertheless, the plaintiff chose to bring a diversity action in federal court. His
ability to bring the action in state court should not affect the power of the federal court
to hear all the claims arising in the one action. Rather, such ability should be a factor
for consideration in determining whether to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against the third-party defendant.
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the fear of increased litigation should not operate as a complete bar
to the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, but should be handled on a
case-by-case basis, with dismissal resulting when judicial economy
would not be achieved.
Analogy to the three Gibbs requirements and consideration of the
arguments against the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction provide a
basis for determining whether a court has the power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. However, the use of that power may not be justified
in all cases. A court must determine whether it should, in its discretion, exercise ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against the
non-diverse third-party defendant. Overlying this examination is the
less compelling nature of diversity jurisdiction compared with federal
question jurisdiction.
Federal question jurisdiction66 confers exclusive jurisdiction over
claims arising under federal statutory law on a federal court. 7 In the
interest of judicial economy, the court may generally hear any other
claims arising from the "common nucleus of operative fact" of the
federal claim. Thus, the compelling nature of federal question jurisdiction weighs in favor of exercising pendent or ancillary jurisdiction
over state law claims. In contrast, diversity jurisdiction merely provides a federal forum for settlement of state law questions." Because
the plaintiff in a diversity action is not forced to assert his state claim
in federal court, diversity jurisdiction provides less compulsion for
federal courts to exercise ancillary jurisdiction in cases like Morgan
than does federal question jurisdiction. 7 This less compelling nature
U.S.
U
CONST. art. III,
§ 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
",See, e.g., Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1196 (5th Cir.
1975).
11 Conversely, if the federal court could not adjudicate all the claims, the plaintiff
would be faced with the possibility of having to duplicate the entire process in state
court. Such a result is not consistenf with the goal of judicial economy. See Bowers v.
Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1975); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, Inc.,
366 F. Supp. 464, 473-74 (D. Del. 1973); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdictionof
the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262, 282-83 (1968).
" See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 705-55 (2d ed. 1973).
"oAyoub v. Helm's Express, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 473, 474 (W.D. Pa. 1969); Comment, PendentJurisdictionand Minimal Diversity,59 IOWA L. REV. 179, 188-89 (1973).
With the advent of almost limitless state long-arm statutes, e.g., International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Marston v. Gant, 351 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Va.
1972), the plaintiff, in a suit against an out-of-state defendant, may choose either his
state forum or the federal forum. In a suit based upon federal statutory law, the
plaintiff is restricted to a federal forum. In either situation, the federal court may
exercise ancillary jurisdiction over related claims or parties. See text accompanying
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of diversity jurisdiction requires a balancing test in which very strict
consideration must be given to all the factors entering
into a court's
7
determination to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. '
Under the broad considerations of "judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to the litigants, 7 2 courts have considered several specific
factors determinative of their discretion to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant. The degree of complexity of the main and ancillary claims is
one such factor. 73 Courts have denied ancillary jurisdiction when the
ancillary claim would have increased the overall complexity of the
case74 and when the ancillary claim was more complex than the main
claim. " Conversely, ancillary jurisdiction has been permitted where
legal standards have differed only in degree. 71 In addition, greater
expense, 77 increased length of trial,7 8 and possible jury confusion"
note 20 supra. In the case of federal question jurisdiction, since plaintiffs main claim
cannot be adjudicated in a state court, the exercise of jurisdiction over an ancillary
claim is rather compelling. In contrast, because an action based upon diversity jurisdiction could be brought in a state court, the federal court should be less compelled to
adjudicate ancillary questions of state law.
" Conversely, because the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in federal question
actions is more compelling, see note 70 supra, the court should be less strict in its
consideration of the discretionary factors determinative of asserting ancillary jurisdiction.
UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
"' Joseph v. Chrysler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Schwab v. Erie
Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Cf. Moor v. County of
Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149,
154 (3d Cir. 1968); Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1975); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 464, 474 (D. Del. 1973); Scovill Mfg.
Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
" Joseph v. Chrysler Corp., 61 F.R.D. 347, 349 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (ancillary claim
would burden "an already complex case"). Cf. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693, 715-16 (1973) (introduction of state tort claim into jury trial of civil rights claim
would render the case unduly complicated). But cf. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe,
Inc., 366 F. Supp. 464, 474 (D. Del. 1973) (no jury confusion because central issue was
construction of one contract).
11 Cf. Scovill Mfg. Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772, 777 (N.D. Ill. 1970)
(ancillary breach-of-contract claim deemed "substantially more complex").
"' Cf. Mitchell v. Hendricks, 68 F.R.D. 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1975). But see Schwab
v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
7 See, e.g., Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45, 52 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (denial
of ancillary jurisdiction would result in "incurring of expenses solely attributable to
duplicated effort" in state and federal courts).
7 See, e.g., Florida E. Coast Ry v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1197 (5th Cir.
1975); CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
7' Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 303 F. Supp. 1398, 1399 (W.D. Pa. 1969). Cf.
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have been other factors with potential for adding complexity to the
case. In Morgan, the cause of the explosion was the sole issue in the
case. The court decided that tracing the cause to four parties instead
of three would not render the case significantly more complex."' Thus,
because the degree of complexity would not result in increased trial
time and expense, inconvenience, or unfairness to the litigants,
asserting ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim against the nondiverse third-party defendant was within the court's discretion.
Two other factors upon which the courts have focused are the
"commonness" of the "nucleus of operative fact"8' and the status of
the state law upon which the ancillary claim is based. Because the
nature of diversity jurisdiction is less compelling than that of federal
question jurisdiction,12 the nucleus of operative fact in a Morgan situation perhaps should be tighter than that required for the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction in a federal question case. Likewise, because
state courts are the proper forum for resolving questions of state law,
federal courts have steadfastly refused to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over a claim based upon unsettled state law.13 Therefore, federal
courts exercising only diversity jurisdiction might defer to the state
courts if the hoped-for judicial economy resulting from an exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction would not be significant.
An additional factor considered by the courts is any disposition
of either the main claim or the defendant's third-party claim prior
to final judgment. Courts have held that any prejudgment disposition
of plaintiff's main claim or defendant's third-party claim relieves the
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 464, 474 (D. Del. 1973).
11Morgan v. Serro Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697, 705 (D. Kan. 1975). The
court determined that hearing the plaintiff's claim against the non-diverse third-party
defendant would not significantly lengthen the trial.
"1 See, e.g., Florida E. Qoast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975)
(plaintiff's claim against defendant, United States, and third-party defendant, Troup,
arose from a washout of railroad tracks due to alleged negligent design, in which both
the United States and Troup were involved); CCF Indus. Park, Inc. v. Hastings Indus.,
Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff's claim against defendant/manufacturer-seller and additional claim against the third-party defendant/installer
arose out of injuries suffered from an explosion of a heating system). Compare B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. A.T.I. Caribe, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 464 (D. Del. 1973), with Scoville Mfg.
Co. v. Dateline Elec. Co., 319 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. I1. 1970).
x2See text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
See, e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). CompareMoor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 715-16 (1973), with Roberts v. Way, 398 F. Supp. 856, 861
(D. Vt. 1975). See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction,33 U. Pin' L. REv. 759, 779 (1972); Comment, PendentJurisdictionand
Minimal Diversity, 59 IOWA L. REv. 179, 190 (1973).
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compulsion for exercising ancillary jurisdiction, resulting in dismissal
of the ancillary claim."4 In light of the less compelling nature of diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts," the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant perhaps should be conditioned upon the continued vitality
at trial of both the plaintiff's original claim and the defendant's
third-party claim. Furthermore, in a diversity action, if the plaintiff's
claim against the non-diverse third-party defendant has been permitted, but then assumes a predominant posture in the trial," or the
issues significantly increase the cost and time burdens upon the
court, the court in its discretion may dismiss the claim. Each case
must be examined carefully to determine whether the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction is proper, thereby avoiding increased litigation
through spurious claims brought only to invoke the federal court's
jurisdiction.
Analysis of Gibbs and examination of the arguments against permitting ancillary jurisdiction provided specific grounds for the
Morgan court's determination that the complete diversity requirement was inapplicable to plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse
third-party defendant. The court concluded that it had the power to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction over such a claim. Cases dealing with
situations similar to Morgan define factual guidelines by which
courts may make a determination whether to use their power to exercise ancillary jurisdiction. In Morgan, the court determined that lack
of collusion, avoidance of two trials without increased complexity,
and a common core of operative facts weighed in favor of exercising
"IKenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 896 (4th Cir. 1972). But
see Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). Cf. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
403 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
" See, e.g., Parker v. W.W. Moore & Sons, 528 F.2d 764-65 (4th Cir. 1975). While
purporting to rely on its previous holding in Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co.,
512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972), the Fourth Circuit in Parkerlimited its reliance to the
facts, which showed that the plaintiff's predominant claim was against the non-diverse
third-party defendant, not against the original defendant. Parker v. W.W. Moore &
Sons, 528 F.2d 764, 765 (4th Cir. 1975). The Parkercourt also noted the criticism of
Kenrose in WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, and MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE. 528 F.2d at 766. See also Fourth Circuit Review, Extension of Ancillary
Jurisdiction to Plaintiffs' Claims Against Nondiverse Third-PartyDefendants, 30
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 295 (1973). Thus, the only circuit to deal expressly with a
plaintiff's claim against a non-diverse third-party defendant may, by its limiting language in Parker, be retreating from an absolute bar against the exercise of ancillary
jurisdiction over such a claim.
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ancillary jurisdiction.87 In addition, courts have focused upon other
discretionary factors, including the status of the state law upon which
the ancillary claim is based and the pretrial disposition of either the
main claim or the defendant's third-party claim. Although broad
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the
litigants suggest the liberal exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, these
discretionary factors compel a close, case-by-case examination in diversity actions to determine whether the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is proper.
SAMUEL J. WEBSTER
KI69 F.R.D. at 704-05.

